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Introduction 
1. This project is funded by the UK’s Economic & Social Research Council (grant reference: RES-
062-23-2644) and has the support of the UK’s Maritime & Coastguard Agency. We also 
gratefully acknowledge the help of the Swedish Sjofartsverket (Swedish Maritime 
Administration) and the Swedish Transportstyreisen (Swedish Transport Agency). The 
project began 1/9/2010 and finishes 31/12/2012. 
2. The project has the dual aims of, firstly, identifying issues in the enforcement of current 
international regulations (both those of the IMO and those of the EU) concerning ships’ 
sulphur and particulate emissions, and secondly, seeking to identify possible future 
enforcement issues relating to future IMO and/or EU regulations on ships’ carbon emissions. 
A final report on the first of these aims has already been made available on the Seafarers 
International Research Centre website. This report is concerned solely with the enforcement 
of possible future regulations on carbon emissions, and in particular with possible market-
based measures such as emissions trading schemes and fuel levies. Note that this focus on 
enforcement issues means that the report does not examine the wider issue of the relative 
effectiveness of different measures in reducing ships’ carbon emissions, except insofar as 
the effectiveness of enforcement itself influences ‘carbon leakage’. Thus, to be clear, a 
regional fuel levy may be easier to enforce than a regional emissions trading scheme, but 
whether or not the levy would be more effective in reducing EU carbon emissions might 
depend crucially on the level at which the levy is set – this report is silent on those wider 
issues of effectiveness.  
3. The project draws on observation of 16 ship inspections in selected UK and Swedish ports, 
involving visits to seven different port-State control offices in the UK and Sweden, and 50 
interviews with inspectors, regulators, shipping industry stakeholders and interested NGOs.   
 
Current Regulations 
1. In July 2011 IMO adopted new regulations to restrict ships’ carbon emissions. In respect of 
new builds, IMO has set out a minimum Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for all new oil 
and gas tankers, bulk carriers, general cargo vessels, refrigerated cargo vessels and container 
ships delivered after July 1st 2013 (EEDIs for other types of vessels are expected to be added 
later), which will require all new-builds to take into account technical improvements in 
engine design and propulsion systems, improved hull designs, recycling of waste heat, etc. In 
respect of all current vessels over 400 gross tonnes, IMO has required all vessels to carry and 
implement a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) incorporating such measures 
as speed optimisation and weather routeing. Both sets of regulations come into force on 
January 1st 2013. Neither of these two sets of new regulations are expected to produce 
major enforcement challenges. Thus, a vessel’s SEEMP would be evaluated and certified by 
class, with port-State control (PSC) simply checking that the class certificate was on board 
and up-to-date.  
2. A technical study by IMO estimates that the EEDI and SEEMP together could, in the longer 
term, cut the emissions rate by 25% to 75% below the current level, depending on different 
modelling asumptions1. But these measures are considered less than adequate by 
themselves because of the anticipated future growth of world trade beyond the current 
level: ‘... the technical and operational measures will not be sufficient to satisfactorily reduce 
the amount of GHG emissions from international shipping in view of the growth projections 
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of human population and world trade. Therefore, market-based mechanisms have also been 
considered...’2. This report is concerned with the potential difficulties in enforcement of 
future market-based measures. 
 
Multiplicity of Market-Based Measures 
1. A major complication in considering the enforcement issues associated with market-based 
measures to reduce ships’ carbon emissions lies in the large number of different measures 
proposed. Thus, ‘the Report of the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment 
of Possible Market-Based Measures,’ made to the 61st Session of IMO’s Marine Environment 
Protection Committee3, considered 10 different schemes proposed at the 60th Session. One 
of these proposals (from the Bahamas Maritime Administration) was essentially an 
argument against market-based measures, stating that rising oil prices would provide an 
incentive for further operational and technical innovations to reduce carbon emissions and 
mandatory emission reduction targets should simply be applied to every vessel (leaving it up 
to the individual ship operator to decide how to achieve the vessel’s target). Another 
proposal (from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature) dealt solely with how 
to provide developing countries with compensatory rebates on the costs of market-based 
measures. The remaining eight proposals concerned: (a) variants on an emissions trading 
scheme (proposals from Norway, the UK and France); (b) variants on a fuel levy (from 
Jamaica and a joint proposal from Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Nigeria and the 
International Parcel Tankers Association); and (c) variants on incentive schemes for 
accelerated technical and operational innovations to cut carbon (proposals from Japan, the 
US and the World Shipping Council). Each different market-based measure could, in 
principle, be enforced in different ways.  
2. A number of other schemes have been suggested which fall quite outside the ambit of the 
IMO, for example, the proposal from Cambridge University’s Tyndall Centre for a Global 
Emissions Trading Scheme (GETS) for transport, administered by a new World Carbon 
Authority4.  
3. The European Union has a pre-existing emissions trading scheme that now includes the 
aviation industry. Frustration at what has been seen to be lack of progress at IMO in securing 
carbon reductions has led to repeated statements from the Commission of the European 
Communities (the Commission) that Europe may set up its own regional scheme to reduce 
ships’ carbon emissions. In 2011, prior to a public consultation on reductions in ships’ carbon 
emissions, DG Clima set out 4 main policy options, all of which include alternative variants5. 
These are: 
(a) A mandatory fuel levy/compensation fund which would apply to all vessels visiting EU 
ports, based on the Cyprus-Denmark-Marshall-Islands-Nigeria-IPTA scheme above, 
where the amount of the levy could be determined by the carbon content of the fuel 
and which would fund maritime sector technical and operational projects to cut 
emissions. A variant on this (based on what is seen as a successful Norwegian 
programme to reduce local NOx emissions) would be an industry-managed 
compensation fund with penalties, whereby the maritime sector would be encouraged 
to implement their own compensation fund, but where Member States would set 
penalties for non-members which were higher than the subscription fee for the fund. 
The industry fund would support technical and operational improvements. 
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(b)  An emissions trading scheme, which could involve the incorporation of shipping into the 
existing EU scheme, or could be a stand-alone maritime ETS. Emissions would be capped 
based on historical data and ‘a monitoring/reporting of vessel emissions [would be] 
required’5. The scheme would draw on the above ETS proposals to IMO. Inclusion in the 
scheme could be phased according to vessel size, type or routes. Such a scheme could 
be a prototype for a future global IMO scheme, or for other future regional schemes 
covering the major world ports. 
(c) A tax on fuel supplied by EU bunkerers. A more complex variant would be a tax on a 
vessel’s GHG emissions levied on all vessels visiting EU ports.  
(d) Mandatory ship-level emission reductions applied to each vessel visiting EU ports, based 
on vessel characteristics such as age and ship-type, as in the Bahamas IMO proposal. A 
variant would provide incentives for ships that exceed their reduction targets in the 
shape of credits that could be traded on carbon markets. 
4. However, in an interview with Lloyds List in October 20126, the European Transport 
Commissioner indicated a change of policy, in that, rather than immediately develop 
separate regional EU ships’ carbon controls in lieu of an IMO regime of market-based 
measures, the Commission would now seek to set up a ‘monitoring, reporting and 
verification’ system (MRV) for ship operators  which would provide baseline data on carbon 
emissions that could be used to form the basis for future IMO market-based measures to 
control  ships’ carbon emissions. The above (item 3.) DG Clima policy options were not 
abandoned, but were described by Commissioner Kallas as ‘conceptual discussions’.  
5. We consider that dealing with the enforcement issues entailed in each one of these separate 
IMO and EU schemes is beyond the scope of this report, partly because the resulting report 
would be too long, and partly because some of the schemes are unlikely to be implemented 
(for example, a tax on EU bunkerers would lead to a partial shift towards non-EU ports for 
bunkering, possible regulatory avoidance through the use of off-shore bunker barges 
operated from outside the EU, and a substantial decline in bunker business for EU bunkering 
ports such as Rotterdam7), but mainly because many of the schemes provide little or no 
detail on enforcement mechanisms. Accordingly, this report is organised so as to attempt to 
identify possible enforcement issues, firstly in respect of generic emissions trading schemes 
for shipping, and secondly in respect of generic maritime fuel levy schemes, with separate 
consideration (where appropriate) being given to global and regional (EU) variants of both 
generic schemes. Inevitably however, this will involve a degree of speculation about the 
enforcement practices likely to be associated with such schemes. A further section of the 
report discusses some of the issues associated with a future EU system for MRV, as 
suggested by Commissioner Kallas.  
 
Enforcement of Emissions Trading Schemes 
1. Generic ETS Enforcement Problems. While this report is primarily concerned with 
enforcement issues which are particular to the shipping industry, it should not be forgotten 
that there are a number of enforcement and monitoring issues that have been reported as 
general problems with ETS and could therefore also apply in the present case of shipping. 
These are: 
(a)  Bogus ‘offsetting’ projects. Instead of, or in addition to, cutting emissions themselves 
companies can choose to invest in emissions-savings projects elsewhere in return for 
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emissions reduction credits (known as CERs) to off-set the company’s own emissions. 
Investments in developing countries can occur under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and investments in other developed countries (usually 
the transitional economies of Eastern Europe) can occur via Kyoto’s Joint 
Implementation Projects. Substantial bottlenecks have occurred in approving these 
schemes: a 2010 World Bank Report stated that it took an average of 572 days for a 
CDM project to go through validation and registration and a further 607 days until first 
issuance (i.e. over 3 years in total)8. Despite extensive verification processes, there have 
been numerous reports of off-setting projects of dubious environmental value and 
others of simple fraud9. Ship operators who find that they have to purchase additional 
carbon credits (a likely feature of a regional EU ETS where some vessels are only 
occasional visitors to EU ports) may only be interested in securing those credits as 
cheaply as possible, and there will always be brokers prepared to offer cheap credits tied 
to fraudulent or environmentally dubious CDMs or JIPs. The environmental campaigner, 
George Monbiot, has called the CDM ‘an exuberant global market in fake emissions 
cuts’10. There is also the difficulty that off-setting CDM projects involving afforestation 
can only be a temporary expedient, given future food needs of an expanding world 
population. Nevertheless, expenditure on CDM projects may be crucial to convincing 
developing countries that a global shipping ETS is compatible with the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ in combating climate change. 
(b) Distortions in carbon markets. The world’s largest carbon market, the EU ETS, has a past 
history of periodic price distortions. It is possible that speculative flows in and out of the 
market could cause distortions, but it is believed that most previous price fluctuations 
have been due to large-scale VAT/sales-tax frauds, taking advantage of the lack of 
harmonised tax regimes across the EU11. A single international registry, instead of 
different national registries for each flag-State, might be necessary to avoid such tax 
frauds. The report of the expert group on market-based measures to IMO’s Marine 
Environment Protection Committee considered that, at the auctioning of allowances, it 
might be necessary to limit the quantity of allowances that may be purchased relative to 
the tonnage associated with a given company, in order to avoid price manipulation by 
third parties and financial institutions3. 
(c) Additional reporting and workload costs. In respect of the recent establishment of an 
aviation sector EU ETS, Mr Stefan Mast of Lufthansa claimed that his company was 
required to report 800,000 single flight events, each with 20 different datasets, i.e. 16 
million datasets in total, and that Lufthansa had consequently spent 3.5 million Euros on 
IT services12. Some shipping industry interviewees were acutely conscious of the 
administrative costs of an ETS: 
‘... in the examples that were given to us, there seemed to be so many other 
additional parties involved that the cost of administering such a system seemed 
illogically high [...]’ [Interviewee A]. 
The IMO expert group reporting on market-based measures estimated an additional cost 
to the industry of $0.7 billion, in respect of the additional onboard workload alone, of 
the Norwegian ETS proposal3.  
2. The Responsible Entity.  While legal action for non-compliance would take place against the 
vessel (for example, detention of the vessel for not having the required carbon credits), 
responsibility for fuel purchases currently often lies with the charterer. The ship operator or 
owner would then be penalised for the sins of the charterer. Successful operation of an ETS 
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may therefore depend on changes in the framing of charter documents to make charterers, 
where appropriate, responsible for obtaining the necessary carbon credits. Since the 
introduction of the low-sulphur regulations have already led to similar changes in chartering 
practice, the issue of the responsible entity may not prove a serious problem for the 
operation of an ETS. 
3. Flag-State Enforcement, Verification and Allocation. The International Maritime Organization 
is a representative body of national maritime administrations (‘flag-States’) and it would 
thus be a natural consequence of the formation of an IMO ETS for each flag-State to be (as 
the UK’s Chamber of Shipping document on ETS puts it) ‘responsible for monitoring 
compliance in respect of its registered ships [...] and for issuing compliance certification’13. 
Monitoring compliance, if it were to be an annual scheme, would entail making sure the 
vessel is registered in the scheme and that its emissions in the previous year did not exceed 
its carbon credits. The flag-State could then issue a document (paper and electronic), 
certifying that compliance had occurred in the previous year, which could be inspected by 
the port-State.  In practice, many flag-States would contract with class societies, such as 
Lloyds Register, to undertake verification on their behalf. Informed opinion seems to agree 
that free allocation of credits would not be feasible for a shipping ETS – carbon credits would 
need to be allocated by auction. Again, the flag-States would be the natural bodies to 
undertake the auctioning, as the legal bodies responsible for the oversight of their ships. 
The difficulty with flag-State enforcement, verification and allocation lies with the presence 
of ‘open’ or ‘commercial’ flag-States. While some commercial registries have sought to 
position themselves as quality flags offering quality services at competitive registration 
rates, others have provided a haven for sub-standard ship operators seeking to save on 
operating costs by regulatory avoidance14. The view of flag-States of the UK judge, Lord 
Donaldson, is that ‘collectively they are a broken reed’15, when some flags are prepared to 
be lax in their enforcement of international regulations, then the opportunity that ship 
operators have to transfer their registrations ensures that, collectively, flag-States are  not 
capable of effective enforcement. In 2003 the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party 
granted a license to a Mr Chong Koy Sen, a Singaporean businessman, to operate the 
Mongolian Ship Registry, although Mongolia is 850 miles from the sea. Mr Chong previously 
operated the Cambodian Registry under license until 2002, when the license was withdrawn 
following international protests at Cambodia’s failure to police its ships16. 
Expert interviewees took different positions on the difficulties posed by flag-State oversight 
of ETS. Thus: 
‘...as long as the flag States in the larger proportion of the world enforce the scheme 
consistently, you’re ok. Even if you lose a few ships down the side [...]. As long as you’ve 
got China in the right end of the scheme’ [Interviewee B]. 
In contrast: 
‘You have nearly 1,500 ships changing flag every month world-wide [...]. So if we start to 
base our work on the flag, then we will have difficulty’ [Interviewee C]. 
And, as it were, in reply: 
‘...once you’ve re-flagged your ship with a flag that isn’t very good at enforcing it [ETS], 
then you are really permanently attached to that flag – right? You can’t flag back in. You 
can’t sort-of-flag-out of Bahamas or Panama - to take two open flags - into something 
that is temporary [...]. And then flag it back in. Because if I was Bahamas or Panama, I 
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wouldn’t let you back in, until you were in compliance [...]. And there are market 
penalties for re-flagging [...]. I would really worry about that ship being impounded in 
another port because of that flag State being known for not enforcing...’ [Interviewee B 
again]. 
Thus, while some experts would argue that, in the longer term, most ship operators will find 
that the attentions of port-State control and the commercial disadvantages of operating 
under lax flags together outweigh the financial advantages of regulatory avoidance, other 
experts believe that the propensity for operators to change to lax flags is such that ETS 
oversight has to be in the hands of a single central authority (rather than the flag-States), 
with enforcement being the responsibility of port-States. It is clear that it would be easier to 
establish such a single ETS oversight authority for a regional scheme, than for a global IMO 
scheme.  
4. The Bunker Delivery Note. In principle, technology is already available which can directly 
measure emissions and transmit those measurements electronically to a central authority. 
Similar technology is already in use to monitor power station emissions, and WR Systems has 
recently contracted to supply its Emsys laser emissions monitoring system on four new-build 
cruise ships17. But concerns have been expressed about the cost of such technology and 
doubts have been expressed about its robustness, once installed on ocean-going ships. Thus, 
where ETS proponents deal with enforcement issues at all, the commonest stated 
enforcement procedure is that of checking documents of fuel consumption (as a proxy 
measure for carbon emissions) against a vessel’s carbon credits. The fuel consumption 
document (which could, in principle, also be an electronic record) is the Bunker Delivery 
Note [BDN]). Thus, the UK Chamber of Shipping’s proposal: 
‘When a ship enters a port, the Port State Control Officer will check the ship’s BDNs and 
compare them with the electronic carbon account balance also provided by the ship. If 
the officer has reason to believe there is a discrepancy, he may call up the ship’s 
account with the central register in the administrative body using the ship’s IMO 
number to check if the ship’s account is order, i.e. that sufficient emission allowances 
corresponding to the BDNs are deposited and thus the ship’s carbon account is in 
balance. If not, the ship is detained until the account is settled’12. 
 Note that the UK Chamber scheme envisages an ETS scheme where a vessel’s carbon 
account must be continuously in credit, whereas some other schemes only envisage an 
annual account-reckoning. In the latter case, it would normally be the flag-State (or a class 
society acting for a flag-State) that would balance the ship’s bunker purchases over the year 
with the ship’s carbon credits, and port-State’s role would normally be simply to  ensure that 
the vessel had a document certifying that the vessel had been in credit in the last year. 
However, whether it is port-State or class that is checking bunker purchases, a number of 
interviewees doubted whether the BDN in its current form was up to the new job that is 
being proposed for it: 
‘The bunker delivery note is no longer just a commercial document, it is a statutory 
document as well. So this has brought whole tiers of regulatory control to an existing 
activity’ [Interviewee D]. 
‘We are concerned sometimes - we hear people who are quite keen to use the BDN in 
its current format for some other purpose [..], documents which are purely commercial. 
If we want to use them we should make them more robust...’ [Interviewee C]. 
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The problems in using the BDN for enforcement purposes were discussed in detail in the 
separate project report on the enforcement of the low-sulphur regulations18. The ship’s copy 
is a carbon copy and is not always legible, particularly after a period of storage. It is 
frequently hand-written. It is frequently supplied by a subcontractor, rather than the 
registered bunkerer and the registration number of the bunkerer does not appear on the 
BDN. Civil litigation is common between bunkerers and ship operators over the quality and 
quantity of fuel. But an expert interviewee was clear that collusive fraud between both 
parties was also a possibility: 
‘What is perhaps more likely [than forgery] would be collusion between the ship’s crew 
and [...] a shore-side supplier, to work some sort of fraud’ [Interviewee E]. 
The use of the BDN for ETS enforcement purposes would, for the first time, provide a 
financial incentive for the collusive under-reporting of bunkering quantities. It is not clear 
how far electronic reporting of bunkering would mitigate this problem, since the collusive 
under-reporting could apply to both the paper and the electronic record. Detection of fraud 
would depend on being able to estimate, for comparison purposes, what quantity of 
bunkers a ship of this type and size would actually require over its previous tracked voyages, 
a calculation that Interviewee B described as ‘a nightmare for the port-States’.  
Further, Interviewee E was sceptical about the possibility of complete electronic record-
keeping occurring in the near-future ‘because it [bunker supplies] is such a fragmented 
industry’. 
The ability of IMO to exercise statutory control over the bunker industry is currently limited 
to the requirement that national maritime administrations keep a register of approved 
bunkering firms. There is little evidence that, in the past, maritime administrations have 
used the threat of withdrawal of registration against recalcitrant bunker operators.  
5. Variation in Port State Control Practice. The enforcement role for port-States in an ETS 
would vary according to whether the scheme in question required a vessel to be 
continuously in credit, in respect of the balance between its emissions and its carbon 
vouchers, or whether the scheme only required a vessel to be historically in credit (i.e. in 
credit at the last annual accounting period). In the former case, port-State has an important 
enforcement role. In the latter case, the major enforcement role would lie with class, acting 
on behalf of the flag-State. An EU ETS, assuming that it would be flag-neutral and embrace 
occasional visitors to EU ports as well as those continuously trading in EU waters, would 
need to operate on the basis of emissions and carbon credits being balanced on a ‘per 
journey’ basis for occasional visitors – again, this would require port-States to have a large 
and potentially complex enforcement role.  
While it may be possible, in principle, for the revenues from an ETS scheme to defray 
administration and enforcement costs, it is also the case that port-State control is not a 
revenue-generating activity for governments, so resourcing may be quite limited, especially 
in developing countries. Even in developed countries, resourcing constraints may be such 
that the present may not be a good time to extend the responsibilities of the current PSC 
workforce: in the UK, the Maritime and Coastguard agency has to find budget cuts of 22% 
over the period 2011-201519. Salaries are sometimes insufficient to attract suitably 
experienced officers: the salary of Indian port-State inspectors, for example, is said to be 
only about a fifth of what senior Indian officers can earn in the international fleet. In some 
failing States, port-State control is simply a cover for local extortion20. All this makes for 
international variation in port-State control practice. 
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Variation is, in any case, a central aspect of PSC practice in many States, where officers are 
required to exercise their discretion in deciding the appropriate penalties for non-
compliance. For example, the Paris MoU Port State Control Instruction 43/2010/05 lists the 
PSC inspection instructions on the low-sulphur fuel regulations as requiring a surveyor to use 
‘professional judgement to determine whether to detain the ship or allow it to sail with 
deficiencies which do not pose an unreasonable threat of harm to the environment’. Some 
maritime authorities, most notably the US Coastguard, adopt a more military-style 
inflexibility in enforcement practice, but many ship operators prefer an explicitly 
discretionary approach to enforcement. All variation in practice, whether due to resourcing 
or the exercise of discretion, poses a potential problem of carbon leakage where PSC is 
made responsible for checking whether ships’ carbon credits are in balance. PSC variation is 
perhaps a larger problem for a global ETS (as opposed to an EU ETS) because global 
variations in enforcement practice are greater than cross-regional EU variations. Certainly, 
the practice of extortion under the cover of PSC in some failing States makes it inadvisable to 
make inspectors responsible for collecting payments for overdue carbon credits. However, 
this seeming advantage for an EU ETS is off-set by the fact that, in the European scheme, PSC 
would have to try and calculate the carbon credits that were owed by deep-sea vessels 
which only entered European waters on an occasional basis. Such calculations would require 
additional training for inspectors and could be a source of uncertainty, contention and 
dispute: 
‘Administering that is going to be a bit tricky, I guess it is just going to be down to 
tracking the vessel, knowing when it entered European waters, try and make some sort 
of assumption on how much it has emitted during that period, converting that into 
whether it has got to pay for [credits]’ [Interviewee A]. 
Two further disadvantages of port-State enforcement are that it is not universally applied 
across all berthing vessels, and that the foci of a port-State inspection on any one vessel will 
be selective. Thus, within the Paris MoU area (i.e. European and Canadian ports), ships are 
targeted for inspection on the basis of their ‘risk profiles’ (type of trade, age, flag-State, etc) 
– a vessel with a low risk profile may berth repeatedly in Paris MoU ports with little 
immediate risk of inspection or detection for non-compliance. And a vessel undergoing port-
State inspection, although it would find itself subject to checks on its certificates (including 
certificated carbon credits), would not necessarily find itself subject to further investigations 
on its carbon compliance – that would be a matter for the Port State Control Officer’s 
discretion. Port State Control, in an oft-used phrase, is ‘a sample, not a survey’.  
And finally, although detention for non-compliance is powerful deterrent tool, many ship 
operators are most concerned, not by the threat of detention per se, by the threat to 
reputation and freight rates that is posed by the publication of detentions on THETIS (the 
Paris MoU website) and subsequently on industry websites, such as Equasis. Non-compliance 
with EU, as opposed to IMO, carbon regulations would be punishable by detention in EU 
ports, but under present arrangements those non-IMO detentions would not appear on 
THETIS and other websites.   
6. Hypothecation. If flag-States were made responsible for allocating carbon credits and 
receiving the revenues of an auctioning process, then some of those States (notably the UK) 
would resist the principle of re-allocation of those revenues as a fund for maritime 
technological innovation and climate mitigation, since they also resist the principle of 
hypothecation of revenues21. The preference of some industry experts for a fuel levy rather 
than an ETS (and both the International Chamber of Shipping and the European Community 
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Shipping Association have now expressed a preference for a fuel levy) is in part related to 
fear that States would simply treat the ETS as a form of corporation tax: 
‘...we recognise that the shipping industry has got to pay for its CO2 emissions [...] in 
some way, but we believe that [...] the money that is generated should be used [...] to 
mitigate climate change, not to line the coffers of the governments that choose to 
collect funds from an emissions trading scheme’ [Interviewee F].   
7. Distortion of trade. Just as with the low-sulphur fuel regulations, there is a fear that 
additional fuel costs for shipping will result in a modal shift, to some degree, from shipping 
to (high carbon emission) road transport. Distortive effects could of course be potentially 
greater for a regional (EU) ETS, with shipping (particularly container shipping) being diverted 
to non-EU ports, and with goods then being transported on by road. The establishment of a 
container hub port in, say Morocco, might be countered by conditionality clauses in EU 
trade/aid agreements with the country concerned. Nevertheless, distortive effects would be 
potentially greater for a regional ETS, while the carbon leakage from frauds of various kinds, 
ineffective enforcement, etc would be less for a regional ETS than a global ETS. 
 
Enforcement of a Fuel Levy 
1. Point of payment. Ostensibly, the most straight-forward payment point for a fuel levy would 
be at the refinery. However, in all schemes where the payment point is stated, the point-of-
sale between the bunkerer and the ship-operator or ship-charterer is the selected payment 
point. Seemingly, this is because a substantial fraction of the refinery capacity is now in oil-
producer countries such as Saudi Arabia (some of which are strongly opposed to controls on 
ships’ carbon emissions) and because of the lack of commitment from refineries: 
‘...the higher up the supply of fuel you go, the more simple it is actually to apply a levy, 
so if the refineries could be persuaded to charge a levy and then submit the funds 
generated to some international fund, then that would be the simplest way forward. 
Clearly, that is not going to happen because you get into problems of national 
jurisdiction and the power of the oil industry...’ [Interviewee F]. 
However, the multiplication of payment points that are entailed when the selected payment 
point is that of bunker sales, clearly raises the possibility of carbon leakage through 
widespread fraud. As previously stated, the bunker industry is an industry where legal 
disputes over deliveries are quite common (hence the use by many ship operators of 
commercial fuel testing laboratories to check fuel samples) and fraud is frequently alleged, 
for example: 
‘The master claimed that a bunkerer operating in a non-European port required the 
[bunker ship] crew to keep a log of the fuel that had been ‘saved’ on each delivery’ 
[fieldnotes]. 
Further, although it is the ship operator that is the party that is legally responsible for paying 
the levy, the actual remittance is made by the bunkerer. Nevertheless, in order to ensure 
that the bunkerer does actually remit the levy, it should in principle only be necessary to 
alter the standard terms of the contract between the bunkerer and the ship operator. Under 
a revised contract, a ship operator whose vessel was detained, because the bunkerer did not 
remit the levy, should be able to claim damages from the bunkerer through the civil courts. 
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However, the legal position may be complicated by the large-scale use of sub-contractors 
(see item 2 below). 
2. Bunker delivery method.  A PSC inspection was observed of a 7606 gross tonnage, 13-year-
old, Maltese-flagged, ro-ro (roll-on-roll-off) cargo vessel: bunkering was a very straight-
forward operation with delivery taking place from a road tanker driven onto the car deck. 
The inspector thought that: 
 ‘too often [...] fuel was delivered by sub-contractors, rather than the registered 
supplier, and sub-contractors had no strong knowledge of, or interest in observing, 
[IMO] regulations’ [fieldnotes]. 
It seems likely that, where bunkers are delivered by a range of unregistered sub-contractors, 
there is a potential for fraudulent evasion of a fuel levy.  
A bunkering operation was also observed at sea from a bunker ship. Bunker ships and 
bunker barges are frequently used for deliveries to larger vessels. The observed bunkering 
took place in a heavy swell. It has been suggested that it would be technically possible for a 
regional (EU) fuel levy to be circumvented by vessels taking delivery from off-shore bunker 
barges, operated from outside the EU. 
3. Bunker Delivery Note. Exactly the same problems as those listed above in respect of the use 
of the BDN in ETS enforcement apply to the use of the BDN in enforcement of fuel levy. In 
particular, the report of the IMO expert group on market-based measures makes the point 
in relation to a fuel levy that ‘the control of bunker suppliers will be organised and 
undertaken according to the national law and administrative organization of the port State’22 
– measures could not be introduced in IMO to mandate member States to act against rogue 
bunker companies. Currently, there are very considerable cross-national differences in the 
regulation of bunker operations: 
‘If you see the bunker industry in Singapore, the way it’s regulated, for me it’s the 
perfect system. And look at the European system – it’s in the pre-historic age compared 
to this [...] - who is controlling the bunker provider?’ [Interviewee C]. 
4. Distortion of trade. Again, the problems listed above in respect of the trade distortions that 
would occur as a consequence of a regional (EU) ETS, also apply to a regional fuel levy: 
‘...all ships would start to bunker elsewhere – the market would be as swift as lightning 
then’ [Interviewee G]. 
The case that is most frequently cited in this connection is that of the impact on bunker 
sales of the introduction of an 8.25% sales tax on bunker fuels in Californian ports in 1991. 
This was said to have resulted in a 60% decline in bunker fuel sales in the ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach in a single year23. An EU bunker fuel levy could also involve a 
modal shift, to some degree, at the margin from short sea shipping within Europe to road 
transport, and would also produce marginal increases in the prices of European-produced, 
sea-transported goods set against foreign goods shipped from outside Europe. Although 
bunker sales to vessels operating continuously in European waters might be unaffected, 
the overall impact on bunker sales could be substantial. The possibility of the 
establishment of bunker hub ports outside the EU (for example, in Morocco) might be 
lessened by conditionality clauses in EU trade/aid political negotiations with neighbouring 
countries, however the threat remains of possible off-shore bunkering operations under 
lax jurisdictions. Evidence suggests that the modal shift and impact on transported goods 
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prices would probably be small: evidence given to the House of Commons Environmental 
Audit Committee suggested that a 5% levy on shipping fuel would translate into an average 
price increase on transported goods of only 0.1%24.    
5. International taxation. Again, just as some governments are opposed to the hypothecation 
of ETS auction receipts, so also some governments (including the UK government) are 
opposed to international taxation schemes such as a fuel levy would entail25.  
6. Variation in Port State Control Practice. An arguable advantage of a levy over an ETS is that, 
as one interviewee put it, ‘the flag-State has nothing to do with it’. However, the 
enforcement problems of a fuel levy for the port-State are similar to those for an ETS. The 
IMO expert group was explicit that, in order to enforce a fuel levy, PSC would be required, 
not just to check the BDNs but also (in order to combat fraudulent under-reporting of fuel in 
the BDN) to compare the BDNs with the Oil Record Book and the ship’s log ‘which may 
require additional appropriate training for Port State Control Officers and additional 
inspection time to undertake’26 – an implicit recognition that not all Port State Control 
Officers in all parts of the globe are currently capable of this kind of detection work. 
Additionally, not all berthing ships would in any case be subject to such comparisons, as not 
all berthing ships are inspected, and as PSC is ‘a sample, not a survey’. In some parts of the 
world, the performance of this additional checking work may open the door to either bribery 
or extortion. 
7. Equivalence measures. The EU aviation ETS provides for exemptions for those airlines which 
can demonstrate that they are subject to equivalent carbon taxes from other States. If there 
is a similar equivalence provision in an EU shipping ETS, then there may be a financial 
incentive for the establishment of bogus equivalence schemes.   
8. Generic Problems of Market-Based Measures. To the extent that an IMO fuel levy is meant 
to generate a Greenhouse Gas Fund for mitigating climate change, then the levy fund would 
be subject to some of the previously mentioned policing problems of bogus off-setting 
projects in the CDM and the JIP. However, there would not be a ‘market’ for cheap bogus 
off-sets with a levy, as there would be through the involvement of brokers in an ETS. A 
regional EU (as opposed to a global) fuel levy would not necessarily need to expend the 
proceeds of the levy on CDM projects (dubious or otherwise), such funds could go instead to 
investments in technologies to further reduce ships’ carbon emissions, but those 
investments would also need to be scrutinised. Finally, a levy should be cheaper to police 
than an ETS and clearly it would not be subject to the potential ETS difficulty of carbon price 
fluctuations. 
 
Monitoring, Reporting & Verification Systems 
An MRV system, as proposed by the EU Vice President and Transport Commissioner, is a 
necessary precursor for the introduction of market-based measures. For a fuel levy, evidence of 
current levels of fuel consumption could be used to estimate the likely yield of a levy and the 
optimum size of the levy. For an ETS, baseline consumption data would be needed for the initial 
allocation of carbon credits.  Both schemes would require fuel consumption data to in order to 
set emission reduction targets. While several schemes for market-based measures envisage the 
need for baseline data on fuel consumption (for example, that proposed by the UK Chamber of 
Shipping13), no published schemes specify in detail how an MRV system to provide that data 
would operate.  
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No announcement will be made about the details of the planned EU MRV system until Spring 
2013 (i.e. after this research project has ended). However, it is likely that the system will operate 
as follows: 
· The recording system would apply to all vessels calling at all EU ports, regardless of 
ownership or flag. The only exclusions would be for smaller vessels: the cut-off point 
is currently unclear, but 3,000 tonnes would be a likely candidate. 
· The vessels in the scheme would be required to submit an annual report of fuel 
consumption per tonne/km and would be issued with a certificate of compliance. 
Vessels which were occasional, infrequent visitors could choose to submit annual 
reports based on estimates, which could be contracted out to consultants. 
· PSC involvement is likely to be confined to checking that the vessel has an up-to-
date certificate. 
· Penalties for non-compliance would be proportionate and cascading, but would 
include potential denial of entry. It is likely that penalties would only follow upon a 
vessel’s second EU port-call (to allow for vessels having to make last-minute changes 
of schedule). 
· The body submitting the report would be the ship-owner/ship-operator. Where a 
charterer was responsible for fuel purchases, the Commission would expect the 
contract with the charterer to include a responsibility to remit fuel consumption 
data to the owner/operator.  
If these supposed arrangements are correct, a number of relevant observations can be made at 
this point: 
1. Some additional administrative costs will be imposed on ship operators. These additional 
costs will be nothing like those of the order reported by plane operator Lufthansa above12 in 
respect of the EU ETS for the aviation industry, but they will nevertheless be unwelcome at a 
time when many ship operators are reporting trading losses. A more serious difficulty may 
lie in the very different structure of the shipping industry compared with the aviation 
industry: the shipping industry, unlike the aviation industry, is highly fragmented, both 
vertically and horizontally. Ship ownership is often divorced from ship operation and, 
depending on the type of vessel charter, operators may or may not be responsible for fuel 
purchases. Further, most sectors of the shipping industry (unlike the aviation industry), are 
not dominated by a few large carriers. Rather, it is the case that there are a large number of 
single ship companies, usually established for tax reasons. Not all of these single ship 
companies could be relied upon to comply with an MRV system. Thus, compliance with the 
requirements of an EU MRV system may be skewed towards the larger operators who, in 
turn, may be operating newer, more fuel-efficient vessels. There is therefore a danger that 
fuel consumption may be under-estimated. 
2. If data from an EU MRV scheme are to be used to estimate global fuel consumption baseline 
data, then it should also be considered that, thanks to the relative effectiveness of Port State 
Control in EU ports, vessels trading in EU ports may be newer and more fuel-efficient than 
those on many other global trade routes.   
3. If the MRV system were to be introduced in the near-future, then it would be in operation at 
time when the shipping industry is experiencing a down-turn in activity. This would need to 
be factored into any future calculation of, for example, the volume of necessary carbon 
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credits for a global ETS at time of enhanced trading conditions. However, this would only be 
a source of difficulty in the unlikely eventuality of a global ETS being introduced in the near-
future. It is much more likely that an EU MRV system would continue to operate over a 
number of years (with varied trading conditions) prior to the introduction of a global ETS or a 
global fuel levy.  
4. The period of the operation of the MRV system also offers a window of opportunity to 
consider potential regulatory and enforcement changes that would enhance the robustness 
of future verification systems for market-based measures. Specific regulatory changes one 
might suggest would include changes to the BDN – at minimum, a requirement to state the 
bunkerer registration number – and a requirement for national maritime administrations to 
inspect bunker suppliers as part of their registration schemes. Enforcement changes one 
might suggest would include better resourcing and training for Port State Control Officers, 
and exploration of the use of the European Maritime Safety Agency’s SafeSeaNet tracking 
system as a future intelligence source to identify non-compliant vessels.   
 
Conclusion 
To reiterate, this report does not seek to provide an overview of the advantages and 
disadvantages, or the feasibility or unfeasibility, or the political difficulties, of different market-
based measures. Rather, it concentrates on the particular enforcement issues that may be 
associated with these measures, both in a regional and in a global context. In so doing, it draws 
on some of the lessons learned from the enforcement practice in respect of the low-sulphur 
regulations18. To be clear, just because a particular measure appears to entail particular 
difficulties in enforcement, that should not be taken to imply that it should not be adopted: the 
same measure may have particular advantages not considered here which could outweigh the 
enforcement problems.  
It is difficult, in any case, to draw firm conclusions on enforcement problems because of the 
multiplicity of different market-based measures that have been put forward and because the 
enforcement schemes associated with these different measures are often lacking it detail. 
Further, because there is no agreed timetable for the introduction of either EU or IMO market-
based measures, it is difficult to estimate how far some of the currently identified enforcement 
problems could be eliminated by technological hardware and software innovations currently in 
development – for example, could the development of cheap and reliable emissions monitoring 
equipment in ships’ funnels obviate the need in ETS to monitor fuel purchases? could scrubber 
systems work for carbon capture as well as sulphur capture? and could the European Maritime 
Safety Agency’s SafeSeaNet tracking system be used to identify and target ships seeking to 
evade an EU fuel levy by bunkering from off-shore barges in European waters?  
Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn: 
1. At the global level, enforcement of a fuel levy is a more straight-forward measure than an 
ETS insofar as it need not involve an enforcement role for flag-States. Since there are some 
flag-States that, to quote Lord Donaldson again, ‘ignore their international obligations’15, 
and since the number of vessels changing flags every month is thought to be around 1,500, 
the non-involvement of flag-States in enforcement could eliminate one important source of 
carbon leakage. 
2. But in contrast, at the regional level, an EU fuel levy might be deemed unattractive because 
of the possible market distortions involved, particularly the damage that might be done to 
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the European bunker industry. Although the establishment of bunker hub ports in countries 
outside the EU (for example, in Morocco) might be avoided by conditionality clauses in EU 
trade/aid agreements, there remains the threat of possible future off-shore bunkering 
operations under other lax jurisdictions. And additionally, vessels that were detained 
because of non-payment of the levy would not (as things currently stand) suffer market 
penalties by having their non-compliance publicised on industry websites, because only IMO 
deficiencies (not EU  deficiencies) are currently publicised on those websites. 
3. In respect of a global fuel levy, the greatest enforcement challenge appears to be that of 
collusion between bunkerers and ship operators or charterers to understate bunker sales in 
order to evade part, or all, of the levy due. Where BDNs and Oil Record Books fraudulently 
misrepresent fuel consumption, it will take competent and confident detective work by Port 
State Control Officers to detect and punish such frauds. Previous research on fraudulent 
seafarer certification, for example, indicated that only a small fraction of those certification 
frauds were likely to be detected by port-State control27. 
4. It may be that the unevenness of controls on bunker firms between different nation-States is 
not a serious enforcement issue for a global fuel levy, insofar as ship operators can obtain, 
through the civil courts, recourse for damages due to a bunkerer’s failure to remit a levy, 
assuming that contracts between bunkerers and ship operators are amended to cover 
responsibility for remitting the levy. However, the use of sub-contractors (who provide the 
BDN) may complicate the issue. It may be necessary to seek legal opinion on this point. 
5. In respect of a global ETS, opinion seems to be divided on whether the potential for evasion 
that is offered by vessels flagging out to lax administrations is such that successful operation 
requires that the responsibility for issuance of compliance certification, verification, and 
allocation of carbon credits be vested in a central authority, rather than individual flag-
States. In an annual scheme, each flag-State would be responsible for ensuring that in the 
previous year each registered vessel did not exceed its carbon credits. Comment on the 
likelihood of flag-States voting to vest these powers in a central authority is beyond the 
scope of this report, but if a central authority is not established, then in an annual scheme 
there is a likelihood of substantial carbon leakage through the migration of ‘free rider’ 
vessels to lax flags. The success of an annual-scheme global ETS would then depend on the 
effectiveness of port-States in detecting and punishing the would-be free riders. 
6. The alternative to an annual-scheme global ETS is one where vessels would have to possess 
sufficient credits to be in balance, not on an annual basis, but on every trip. This diminishes 
the enforcement role for the flag-State, but (as well as being administratively more complex) 
this again makes the port-States pivotally important in enforcement.  
7. In some parts of the world, due to problems of resourcing, recruitment, local corruption and 
other factors, PSC is clearly not up to the challenge of effectively enforcing a global ETS. But 
this need not be a large problem since few of the world’s major shipping routes are part-
policed by these ineffective port-States. The enforcement challenge of both a regional ETS 
and a global ETS for effective port-States is threefold: 
(a) To check that the vessel’s carbon compliance certificate is up-to-date (a straight-forward 
matter);  
(b) To check the vessel’s carbon balance and compare that with the vessel’s BDNs (less 
straight-forward, given that BDNs are often hand-written, sometimes illegible, 
sometimes not in English, etc.) 
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(c) To check for fraud through the under-reporting of fuel consumption (very difficult). 
It seems clear that some of the receipts from an ETS would need to be spent on additional 
resourcing of PSC to undertake these pivotal additional tasks. 
8. An EU ETS has the advantage of being based on accumulated administrative experience 
(now also incorporating the aviation industry) and additional experience could be 
accumulated by a phased introduction (for example, by only be applied initially to certain 
types of trade). It too would be heavily dependent on effective PSC enforcement. While this 
would be unproblematic for vessels regularly trading in Europe, it would be necessary for 
PSC (or an alternative authority) to calculate the carbon credits required by occasional 
visitors to EU ports, based on the length of their voyage in European waters. As with an EU 
fuel levy, non-compliant ETS vessels would escape adverse publicity on industry websites 
because they had only contravened EU, not IMO, regulations. 
9. Insufficient attention appears to have been given to bunker firms which collude in fraud. Lax 
flag-States can be made less commercially attractive by the targeting of their vessels by PSC, 
but similar effective sanctions are not available for fraudulent bunkerers. It would be 
possible for bunkerers found repeatedly guilty of fraud to have the registration withdrawn, 
but we are not aware that this has been suggested in any of the published ETS or fuel levy 
schemes.  At present the BDN does not record the bunkerer’s registration number. 
10. The imminent introduction of an EU MRV system to provide baseline data for future market-
based measures also offers a time window in which action could be taken to tighten-up 
regulation (most obviously in respect of the BDN) and enforcement (most obviously in the 
better resourcing and training of Port State Control Officers). 
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